# ГОСУДАРСТВО, ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО И СТАБИЛЬНОСТЬ

## STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND STABILITY

# Migration Policy Towards Migrants in Border Regions of Russia: Statistical Analysis and Population Estimates

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**Abstract.** The specificity of return migration in Russia rests on historical backgrounds and since 2006 is in large part connected with the intentions of the Russian government to usereturn migration as a resource of development of regions having increase in population due to low fertility, aging or strong out–migration. The study presented in the article is focused on the analysis of outcomes of the State program of repatriation along with attitudes of local population toward different political policies, concerning return migration, studied during social surveys in seven border regions, located in different parts of Russia. It has revealed that general pragmatic orientation of population towards international migration is combined with different political strategies

supporting compatriots. Their choice is determined by objective, socio–structural, and subjective, related to culture and education, factors, but their weight and significance differ depending on initial discrepancies in socio–economic, demographic and ethno–cultural characteristics of regional societies.

**Keywords:** return migration, repatriation, selective migration policy, human development, border regions, perceptions of migration policy strategies

# Миграционная политика в отношении возвратных мигрантов в приграничных регионах России: статистический анализ и оценки населения

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**Аннотация**. Возвратная миграция в России имеет обширный исторический бэкграунд, и начиная с 2006 г. ее развитие в значительной степени связано с намерениями российского правительства использовать возвратную миграцию в качестве источника человеческого развития в приграничных регионах, испытывающих демографические проблемы, вызванные старением, снижением рождаемости и миграционной убылью населения. Результаты исследования, представленные в статье, сфокусированы на анализе итогов реализации государственной программы содействия добровольному переселению соотечественников и оценок населения в отношении миграционной политики, включая меры по поддержке возвратной миграции, полученных в результате социологических опросов, проведенных в семи регионах, локализованных в различных зонах российского приграничья. Полученные данные указывают на то, что общая прагматическая ориентация населения на международную миграцию сочетается с поддержкой различных политических стратегий в отношении соотечественников. Их выбор определяется объективными, социоструктурными

и субъективными факторами, но их вес и значимость различаются в зависимости от изначальных различий в социально-экономических, демографических и этнокультурных условиях в отдельных регионах.

**Ключевые слова:** возвратная миграция, селективная миграционная политика, репатриация, человеческое развитие, приграничные регионы, восприятие стратегий миграционной политики

## Introduction

### *Return migration as a global process and a subject of migration studies*

Return migration is a multifaceted phenomenon, involving different life situations and migration trajectories. Being a middle ground between continuous migration and non-migration, continuous migration and migration, supposing frequent departures and returns — seasonal, contract migration and commuting, return migration holds a special place in migration theory and practice, which is reflected in specific terminology, conceptual approaches and methods of research.

In the most general terms, "return migration" describes a move to the country of origin, the place of constant residence or previous country of transit after living on the territory of other state (Dustmann & Weiss, 2007). In this regard, return migration is placed within a broad context, and since circumstances of migration or departure are not taken into consideration, it allows to incorporate various migration practices, such as re-emigration, post-educational migration, return of refugees and deportation of non-documented migrants. The more narrow and operationalized definition underlines the special role of the state to defend national interests and resolve social, economic, demographic, humanitarian and other issues by managing return migration. It is a voluntary, as far as possible, form of international migration, concerning people and their descendants wanting to move back to their country of origin, and giving grounds for a simplified procedure of citizenship or residence permit acquisition.

Depending on whether the state (sending or receiving) has an impact on return migration it is customary to distinguish between its stimulated and non-stimulated forms. The first occurs when there are special state programs of repatriation, aimed at increasing return migration (such programs exist in Russia, Israel, Greece, Germany, Kazakhstan) with territorial — when the state gives preferences to channel the migrants' flow in definite regions of the country (Russia, Greece, Israel), or categorical — used to maintain the necessary quality of returnees' flow, (Germany) stimulation. Declarative (non-stimulated) return migration policies exist in many countries, where preferences are done only for receiving citizenship (Finland, France, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Denmark,

Russia — before the adoption of the State Program for assisting the voluntary resettlement in the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad) (Ryazantsev & Grebenyuk, 2014).Repatriation programs help emigrants and their descendants to return home or to their historical homeland. The right to move is granted to former citizens who had gone abroad for various reasons — because of war actions, economic crisis, discrimination based on political views, race, gender or religion, and so forth.

Although the first few and unsystematic attempts to analyze return migration started in 1960s (Bovenkerk, 2012), the intensive elaboration of return migration issues in Western countries occurred in 1980s, when developed states with significant volumes of labor migrants have faced their mass exodus to homelands. Being a subprocess of international migration, return migration has become a subject of research within different theoretical approaches, often suggesting competing and coming from opposite assumptions and interpretations of motives and consequences of return migration provisions. The corresponding scientific literature relies on five main paradigms through which the analysis of return migration was guided during recent decades, but it has become habitual to claim that all these theories need a critical review in response to growing diversity of migrants, from economic to refugees and seeking asylum, and changes in perception of migration, which became an important factor of sustainable development in sending countries(Constant & Massey, 2003 ; Cassarino, 2004 ; Ivakhnuk, 2015).

*The neoclassical theory of migration* draws on the analysis of differences in wages in sending and receiving countries and expectations of migrants to earn more in the country of destination. The return migration is regarded as migration failure, which has not resulted in the expected profit in part because of non–effective use of human capital. In contrast to this approach, *the new economics of labor migration* (NELM) considers return migration as a "logical outcome of a carefully calculated strategy", determined on the level of migrant's household and resulted from successful achievement of goals, such as higher earnings or financial savings. So, there is a clear shift from individual-level analysis to comprehension of collective interdependence of all participants of migration process (Stark, 1991). The return appears as a natural result of working abroad, and significant part of migration strategy is related to remittances, allowing to diversify resources of the household and compensate risks, related to the absence of effective insurance in the countries–recipients.

Within *the structural approach*, the migrant's return is considered not only in the context of individual experience or household, but also in the context of social and institutional factors in the countries of origin. Similarly to the new economic approach, it is claimed that the decision about return and successful integration is influenced by remittances. The question about success or failure of migration is analyzed through correlations between expectations of the returnee and economic and social reality in the country of origin. Situational and contextual factors are the prerequisite for comprehension of how the strength of local traditions and values adjust expectations and intentions of the migrant after return. If this adjustment fails, the returnee can undertake a new emigration (Cassarino, 2004).

In the late 1980s the wish to explain the dynamic and sustainable link between sending and receiving countries and bi–directional flows of crossing borders migrants

has led to the creation o*f the transnational paradigm* borrowing its terminology in the field of international relations (Wessendorf, 2007). Transnationalism serves as a conceptual framework for the research of strong social and economic ties between donor and recipient countries, and their transnational character stems from regular social contacts sustainable in time (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999). One important research direction is the analysis of the impact these ties can have on migrants' identities. Unlike structuralists or adepts of the NELM, transnationalism points out that return does not necessarily mean the end of migration cycle, and that migration history continues. Return migration is included in the system of circulating exchanges and relations, facilitating the reintegration of migrants and promoting transmission of knowledge and information.

Recent research based on transnational perspective has shown that structural integration into receiving society, namely behavior in labor market, education and maintenance of economic relations with host country, has a lesser effect on intentions about return, investment and social networks in origin are positively associated, whereas sociocultural integration into receiving country, in contrast, has negative influence on return initiative, thus, there is no uniform process of return migration and that competing theories are rather complementary and mutually reinforcing (De Haas &Fokkema, 2011; De Haas, Fokkema, &Fihri, 2015). *The networking theory*, just like the transnational paradigm concentrates on the maintenance of social connections between "former" and present place of residence, reflecting migration experience, but they are considered as supplementary and independent resources, used for secure return and reintegration. Scholars, working within this approach are mostly interested in network composition and emerging social structures, configuration of ties, supporting transborder contacts (Christou, 2006; Haug, 2008; Reynolds, 2010). The actual state of return migration research is characterized by the synthesis and integration of different conceptual approaches, their complementary use for testing empirical hypotheses and building formalized models on the base of quantitative, statistical or qualitative, ethnographic data.

### Return migration in Russia: from spontaneous to organized flows

Unlike Western countries, Russia faced the problem of return migration only in 1990s, when, after the dissolution of the USSR the country had been flooded by migrants arriving from its former republics. This flow was in great part represented by ethnic Russians and so called "non-titular" nationalities of new independent states, and the main reason for migration in that period was to avoid ethnic conflicts, war actions or harassment by authorities (Ivakhnuk, 2011). Sociological studies of this period revealed that Russian regions receiving these migrants were in a crisis and demonstrated their inability to ensure social adaptation and living conditions for settlers, that provoked social tension and conflicts between locals and newcomers. Although many of them were highly educated and skilled professionals favorably disposed towards Russia, and, thus,represented human capital, that could contribute tothe regional development, due to the pressure from local population, unresolved domestic, labor and economic issues, a large amount of compatriots were forced to leave their unhospitable homeland and return to places,

they have been chased out by reprisal attacks (especially, about such experience reported many Russians from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) (Nazarova 2000; Baranova, 2005).

By the early 2000s, the intensity of migration caused by unfavorable political processes in the CIS and Baltic countries decreased, whereas temporary labor migration came to the fore. Russia had become one of global centers of migrants' attraction, while active emigration from Russia contributed to increased number of Russian–speaking communities in foreign countries of the "far abroad". At present, the main volume of return migration is represented by settlers from the CIS countries, return migration from other countries is negligible, and realization of migration potential in greater extent is determined by factors, related to the situation in Russia, rather than in countries of current residence, that indicates the need for more friendly and open policy towards compatriots (Khramova, Ryazantsev, & Pismennaya, 2017; Maximova, Noyanzina, Omelchenko, & Maximova, 2018). The need to improve migration policy requires consideration of different categories of returnees — labor, political, educational or forced migrants, which have or have not Russian origins or citizenship, but anyway linked to Russia by life trajectories, perceptions or experiences of living in Russia. The analysis of their adaptive strategies and migration experience along with attitudes of local population towards return migration will allow to make some important conclusions about determinants, consequences and opportunities of return migration, not only for migrants themselves, but also for receiving regions, their human development.

**Materials and Methods**

Return migration has become the subject of complex investigation, which included the analysis of statistical data on the results of the State program on rendering assistance to voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad and sociological surveys in seven border regions of Russia, aimed at studying attitudes of local population towards different migration policy strategies, including return migration.

The results of the State program were taken from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and the site of the Ministry of internal affairs. Sociological surveys were conducted in the Altai krai, the Orenburg oblast, the Murmansk oblast, the Pskov oblast, the Republic of Altai and the Republic of Dagestan (2020–2021, quota sampling with random walk, n=500 in each region, the overall sample n=3500).

Regions with similar socio-economic, demographic and migration situation were divided into three clusters, and further analysis was fulfilled separately in each cluster. Two main policy strategies concerning return migration — to support returning Russian or Russian-speaking people from other countries and to support compatriots of different nationalities returning from the CIS countries were compared with other liberal or restrictive migration strategies. Factors, determining the support of ethnically and linguistically based strategy or broader definition of "compatriots" and internationalist approach were revealed, that allowed to link attitudes toward migration with regional developmental characteristics.

Statistical methods, used in the analysis, included frequency analysis, cluster analysis and binomial logistic regression.

**Results**

*The analysis of outcomes for Russian regions of the State program on rendering assistance to voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad*

Return migration in Russia concerns not only ethnic Russians, but also those who were born or have long lived on theterritory of the Russian state and their descendants. The term "compatriot" first appeared in the Russian law in 1999 and was based on the territorial and ethnic grounds, that had given rise to considerable criticism, related to moral and legal rights of representatives of excluded nationalities, also preserving mental and spiritual ties with Russia, Russian language and culture (Ryazantsev & Grebenyuk, 2014). Difficulties of interpretation and broad public discussion have led to changes in legislation concerning policy of Russia towards its citizens living abroad, and in 2010 legislators have enacted an extended definition, based on subjective self-identification and acknowledgement of belonging to Russia, justified by objective evidence — professional or public activity, loyalty and wish to preserve and develop Russian culture and language, to maintain personal and public connections with Russians living abroad. Since 2007, the return migration has become more regulated through the adoption of the State program for assisting compatriots residing abroad in their voluntary resettlement in the Russian Federation.

This multi-purpose program is focused on integration of economic and social potential of compatriots and developmental needs of Russian regions which have socio-economic perspectives but are threatened by high rates of out-migration. Thus, it looks forward to compensating natural decrease of population in Russian regions by attracting people from other countries, raised in the Russian cultural traditions, proficient in the Russian language and willing to return in Russia. It is claimed that compatriots are best able to adapt and engage in positive social links with receiving society. Thus, the program is embedded in the system of targeted interventions aimed at stimulating birth rate and reducing mortality, regulating migration and, thus, stabilizing the number of population in the Russian Federation, the return of compatriots itself is not its priority goal.

To attract resettlers the Program provides for significant, at least for majority of Russians, state guarantees and measures of social support, such as duty-free importation of the household effects, reimbursement for transportation costs, start-up allowances and assistance in getting a job, educational or medical services. Originally the program was designed to cover the period 2009–2012 and receive about 300 thousand of compatriots, especially ethnic Russians from the "near abroad". Unfortunately, expectations of officials were not justified. Despite increase in the number of regions — participants, the number of applicants was not significant and consisted only about 3 thousand for first two years. The main issues were related to the reluctance of regions to receive compatriots: there was a lack of affordable housing, vacancies didn't correspond to expectations of resettlers — they were relegated to undesirable low-paying jobs; territories for settling were not attractive, compatriots were invited predominately in agricultural regions with undeveloped infrastructure. Significant decrease was caused inter alia by influence of economic crisis and, as consequence, by almost fourfold reduction of funding, from 8 billion to 1.8 billion (Ryazantsev, Pis'mennaya, & Khramova, 2015).

Meanwhile, the list of regions was extended and in 2012 it had already included 40 regions. Initially, there were three categories of territories — parts of federate entities with different volumes of state guarantees and social support, where compatriots were attracted according to regional programs. In 2012 the new edition of the State program was adopted and the program had become open-ended. Three above-mentioned categories of territories were replaced by the "territories of priority resettlement" in the Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts with higher State guarantees and benefits and other territories without special accent on special parts, accessible for resettlement. New conditions have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of regions — participants.

As of 1 January 2020, the State program was implemented in 76 subjects of the Russian Federation in eight federal districts. In 2019 108.5 thousand of compatriots and members of their families have resettled to Russia, among them 59.5 thousand or 54.9% — have formalized their participation in the Program via authorized institutions abroad and 49.0 thousand or 45.1% have applied to authorities in Russia. In 2020–2021 the stream of participants has decreased significantly due to the epidemic of the SARS-CoV-2 (62.0 thousand in 2020 and 78.5 in 2021). Overall, over the past 11 years (2010–2021) the number of participants of the Program was over 1 million of people, that's basically population of a large city, and population with a priori positive attitude towards Russia, having historical and cultural collective memory, identification and solidarity with their future fellow citizens, motivated to restore old and create new ties with inhabitants of Russia (Toshenko, 1997; Vyshnevsky, 2000). The largest number of participants was recorded in 2015 — 179.6 thousand of people (Table 1).

By the number of involved compatriots the uncontested leader is the Central federal district, covering over 40% of all participants of the Program, especially in Lipetsk, Kaluga and Voronezh oblasts (more than 40 thousand of resettlers in each region), the second place is occupied by the Siberian federal district with biggest centers of return migration in the Novosibirsk and Omsk oblasts (more than 25 thousand), and the Krasnoyarsk territory (more than 10 thousand). The third and fourth places in different years are taken by the Volga federal district, where most significant return flows are observed in the Kaliningrad oblast, and the Northwestern federal district, where the leaders are the Saratov and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts. The North Caucasian district has contributed the least, due to the recent participation — only from 2014 and until recent times only with one region — the Stavropol territory. In the Southern federal district, the situation is similar: there are four regions, including the Astrakhan oblast (since 2015), the Krasnodar territory (since 2016). The leader is Volgograd oblast (about 16 thousand people). Given that these regions are not among outsiders and have no need in additional population, they are free to define additional conditions for participation in the Program. For instance, in the Krasnodar region there is an obligatory condition to have medical or pedagogical education and give consent to live and work in rural area.

Additionally, it is worth examining the functioning of the Program in regions, denominated as the "territories of priority resettlement", which are situated in the Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts. According to statistics, the Irkutsk oblast has achieved

the best results in attracting resettlers — about 20 thousand people have moved into this region from 2007 to 2019. The Primorsky krai is on the second place with 16.3 thousand, and the Khavbarovsk territory is on the third one (15.1 thousand). The worst positions in this category are taken by regions with low standards of living — the Zabaykalsky territory (3.0 thousand people), the Jewish autonomous oblast (1.7 thousand) and the Republic of Buryatia (1.4 thousand), into which compatriots have no desire to move, despite declared benefits and preferences.

Thus, notwithstanding general positive effects of the Program and its stable project level, it turned out that its outcomes vary greatly in different regions, not all of them can ensure attractive conditions and fulfil their obligations, that casts doubt on efficiency to achieve main tasks of the program, including those related to the regional sustainable development. Especially it concerns regions with the worst demographic and economic situations and intense out—migration, having difficulties with attracting and retaining compatriots on their territories.

Table 1.

Number of participants of the Program resettled in
Russia in 2010–2021, in thousands of people

Таблица 1.

Количество участников государственной программы,
переселившихся в Россию, тыс. чел.

| Territory | 2010 | 2012 | 2015 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Federation | 11,8 | 56,6 | 179,7 | 118,6 | 107,7 | 108,5 | 62,0 | 78,5 | 1035,1 |
| Central federal district | 5,7 | 27,4 | 76,6 | 48,9 | 43,0 | 40,5 | 23,2 | 28,4 | 432,2 |
| Northwestern federal district | 2,8 | 7,8 | 14,5 | 11,6 | 8,7 | 8,6 | 6,2 | 7,0 | 98,9 |
| Southern federal district | 0 | 0,4 | 6,9 | 4,8 | 4,1 | 3,3 | 1,7 | 1,8 | 33,5 |
| North Caucasian federal district | 0 | 0 | 2,6 | 1,3 | 1,0 | 0,9 | 1,0 | 0,5 | 9,2 |
| Volga federal district | 0,4 | 3,7 | 21,2 | 13,7 | 12,1 | 14,0 | 8,1 | 10,7 | 114,8 |
| Ural federal district | 0,2 | 1,1 | 20,3 | 14,1 | 13,5 | 14,6 | 7,2 | 9,7 | 105,8 |
| Siberian federal district | 1,9 | 11,5 | 27,0 | 18,8 | 19,8 | 20,6 | 10,8 | 15,4 | 178,8 |
| Far Eastern federal district | 0,8 | 4,7 | 10,6 | 5,4 | 5,5 | 6,1 | 3,6 | 5,1 | 61,8 |

Sources: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Ministry of internal affairs of the Russian Federation (calculated by authors).

***Attitudes of population living in border regions towards return migration: support of ethnically–driven and internationalist policy strategies***

Return migration in Russian regions is not only embedded in the general process of international migration, perceptions of population about migration and migration regimes towards former citizens and diasporas are interconnected with social moods, evaluations of social security, quality of life and social relations in the regional society.

Investigating these processes in seven Russian border regions required preliminary examination of socio-economic conditions and experience of participation of region in the state initiatives encouraging loyal expatriates to return to Russia, determining in an obvious way social attitudes of their inhabitants.

The analysis of indicators of socio-economic and demographic development (Table 2) allowed to detect three groups of regions confirmed by statistical clusterization (two-step cluster analysis).

The first cluster was represented by the Murmansk, Rostov and Orenburg oblasts — relatively prosperous and well–developed regions, with high GRP per capita (285–527 thousand rubles), low unemployment rate and poverty thresholds. These regions possessed rather favorable demographic situation with low coefficients of national decrease and values of demographic pressure were defined in greater extent by number of non-working young people than by old-age dependency ratio.

The second cluster included the Pskov oblast and the Altai krai — regions with certain economic issues — dependency from federal budget subventions, low average income levels, high proportion of population with earnings below the minimum living standard (about 18%), high demographic burden on population of working age caused by intensive aging, considerablepopulation decline (especially in the Pskov oblast, where the average rate of natural increase consisted-7,5).

The third cluster — the national republics of Dagestan and Altai — regions with the lowest GRP and high poverty thresholds (in the Republic of Altai — 24.2%), high levels of unemployment (about 11%). Simultaneously, traditionalist economy and way of life were associated with high fertility and natural population growth, and, consequently, low old-age dependency ratio.

Belonging to a cluster was blended with the time of inclusion in the federal program on repatriation, and, at least partially, with program outcomes. Thus, the regions of the first cluster had more experience in elaborating regional programs of assistance (the first programs appeared in 2014), and within the past three years (2017–2019) received more compatriots, especially in comparison with the third cluster: the Murmansk oblast hosted 1672 compatriots (2.1 thousand per million of people), the Rostov oblast — 5290 (1.3 thousand) and the Orenburg oblast — 4015 (2.0 thousand). The Altai krai and the Pskov oblast took part in the federal program since 2016 without any limitations in the choice of place for resettlement, and the number of returned compatriots consisted 4760 (2.0 thousand per million) and 3450 persons (5.5 thousand per million) correspondingly. Regions of the third cluster were among last regions where the federal program was implemented. The Republic of Dagestan adopted its regional program in 2019 and there are already some very modest results (141 persons reported in 2019). In the Republic of Altai the program will be implemented in 2020–2021 as a subprogram within the framework of the state program on social protection and promotion of employment of population, its target is to attract 30 compatriots by the end of 2021. So, if in more advanced regions with more competitive economies return migration was under long governmental control in the lagging regions the lack of experience (and real return migration as such) was combined with their proper socio-economic issues and specifics of development.

Table 2.

### Indicators of socio-economic and demographic development in seven regions covered by the research, average values*

Таблица 2.

### Индикаторы социально-экономического и демографического развития в семи регионах, охваченных исследованием, средние значения*

| Indicator | 1 cluster | | | 2 cluster | | 3 cluster | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MO | RO | OO | PO | AT | RA | RD |
| Number of population (2014–2019), millions of people | 0.8 | 4.2 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 3.0 |
| Rate of natural increase (2014–2018) | −0.4 | −2.6 | −0.7 | −7.5 | −2.4 | 7.4 | 12.2 |
| Total fertility rate (2014–2018) | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 2.0 |
| International migration growth (average, 2014–2018) in thousands of people | 1.1 | 5.8 | 2.5 | 0.7 | 2.5 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| Inter–regional migration growth (2014–2018) in thousands of people | −5.4 | −3.6 | −10.3 | −1.3 | −8.4 | −0.3 | −13.0 |
| Percentage of population or earning less than the minimum living standard (poverty threshold) (2014–2018) | 12.26 | 13.64 | 13.8 | 17.86 | 17.54 | 24.18 | 12.5 |
| GRP per capita 2014–2017, thousand rubles | 527.9 | 285.0 | 387.9 | 215.2 | 204.8 | 197.7 | 190.9 |
| Proportion of economically active people (2014–2018) | 50.48 | 45.74 | 48.76 | 46.38 | 43.76 | 39.94 | 34.94 |
| Unemployment rate (average, 2014–2018) | 7.2 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 7.36 | 11.06 | 11.1 |
| Demographic burden (general) (2014–2019) | 658 | 756 | 785 | 827 | 817 | 837 | 645 |
| Old-age-dependency ratio (2014–2019) | 356 | 466 | 434 | 532 | 478 | 324 | 214 |

* Notation of regions: the Murmansk oblast — MO, the Pskov oblast — PO, the Rostov oblast — RO, the Republic of Dagestan — RD, the Orenburg oblast — OO, the Republic of Altai — RA, the Altai krai — AT.

Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), calculated by authors.

The analysis of results of sociological surveys has shown that local population in all regions, except the Republic of Altai, approve pragmatic migration policy focused on encouraging young and skilled people to immigrate into Russia (especially in the Republic of Dagestan and in the Murmansk oblast where this strategy was selected as preferable by more than 40% of respondents). Restrictive policy and ban on entry were not popular (5–9% of choices), except in two regions from the first cluster, where significant part of population was against migrants, regardless their origin — the Rostov oblast (11.0%) and the Orenburg oblast (26.3%). Liberal strategy, aimed at supporting everybody who wants to live in Russia was more attractive and here there was a clear association with socio-economic and demographic indicators. The national republics were among most hospitable and welcoming migrants (28–32% of acceptance), in the regions of the second

cluster the proportion of people supporting liberal strategy was 22–24%, while in the first cluster — only about 14–16% (Table 2).

The nationalist strategy of return migration, entailing support of ethnic Russians and restrict the entry to other nationalities, has received much skepticism. It was higher evaluated in three regions with predominating Russian population — the Altai krai, the Pskov and the Rostov oblasts (27–28% of choices), while other regions with diversified ethnic structure were less supportive of this migration regime: in the Orenburg oblast, where the number of ethnic Russians was less than 75% according to the Russian Census of 2010, it was chosen as preferable by 21.2%, in the national republic with dominant non-Russian population — by only 13–17%.

The idea to give more support to compatriots from the CIS countries was rather disapproved in the Orenburg and Rostov oblasts, where international migration was more intensive (only 11.6% and 15.4% of choices). In the Pskov oblasts it was less preferable in comparison with ethnically and linguistically driven strategy (22.6%), whereas in the remaining regions attitudes were similar and this variant was selected as preferable by 24–29% of research participants.

As it was acceptable to choose two preferable strategies, the more differentiated analysis could supplement simple univariate consideration. The majority of respondents (65%) have chosen a single variant, while for the rest there were 10 possible combinations. The restrictive policy was the most straightforward, it was chosen as unique variant in 84% of cases, whereas the liberal strategy was more "friendly" and accompanied by other answers, including strategies of repatriation.

Table 3.

Attitudes of population towards different strategies
of migration policy, including return migration, %

Таблица 3.

Отношение населения к различным стратегиям миграционной
политики, включая возвратных мигрантов, %

| Region / Strategy of support | All who wants to stay in Russia | Only Russians and Russian-speaking people | Only compatriots from the CIS countries | Only young and skilled migrants | Restrictive (nobody should be supported) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Altai krai | 21.5 | 28.3 | 28.3 | 28.8 | 6.3 |
| The Pskov oblast | 24.2 | 28.5 | 22.6 | 35.9 | 4.9 |
| The Orenburg oblast | 15.2 | 21.2 | 11.6 | 36.3 | 26.3 |
| The Murmansk oblast | 13.7 | 24.9 | 29.4 | 42.7 | 8.9 |
| The Republic of Altai | 31.6 | 13.2 | 27.3 | 22.7 | 8 |
| The Rostov oblast | 16.3 | 27.3 | 15.4 | 33.1 | 11.3 |
| The Republic of Dagestan | 28.0 | 16.6 | 24.0 | 42.2 | 8.5 |

Comparative analysis allowed detecting four essential patterns of migration policy strategies supported in the regions.

The first pattern was relevant for the Orenburg, Rostov and Pskov oblasts, where inhabitants preferred to support simultaneously Russian and Russian-speaking migrants and migrants from the CIS countries (43.4% in the Orenburg oblast and 23–25% in two other regions), and on the second place — migrants from the CIS and young and skilled specialists (about 23% in all regions).

In the Murmansk oblasts the most preferred combination was to support compatriots from the CIS countries and young migrants (33.6%), while support of Russians along with citizens from ex–USSR was on the second place (22.1%).

In the Altai krai respondents more often combined the support of ethnic Russians and young professionals (25.0%) that was in accordance with demographic tendencies, related to aging and relative ethnic homogenity of this region, while the second preferred combination was to support Russians and compatriots from the CIS countries (22.0%).

The fourth pattern was specific for national republics, where the most supportedregime was to receive all categories of migrants without any differentiation or to look favorably at compatriots from the CIS countries (31–32%). The second place was occupied by the support of migrants from the CIS countries and young professionals (23.0% in both regions), while positive attitude towards representatives of the Russian diaspora or Russian speaking compatriots was demonstrated by 20.0% of respondents in the Republic of Altai and only by 15.7% — in the Republic of Dagestan.

After summation of two return migration strategies it was found that they were supported by a total of 43% of respondents, and further analysis was aimed at finding significant factors determining their choice, other than those which have been already included in cluster division. For this purpose, a set of logistic regression analyses was fulfilled in each cluster with political strategy as dependent variable and possible determinantsdefined during preliminary bivariate analysis as independent predictors. The list included objective socio-structural factors, such as place of residence, education, gender, belonging to diasporic groups or financial situation in the household, and subjective factors, among which personal attitudes toward migrants living in the region, evaluation of migration intensity in the place of residence, perception of security and comparison of socio–economic position of the region with other regions of Russia.

Results of regression modeling for support of Russians and Russian-speaking people are presented in the Table 4. They show that there was a single factor significant for regions from all three clusters (in the third cluster it was at least marginally significant) associated with the choice of this strategy — the personal attitude towards migrants, living in the region. The sign of coefficient indicated that this association was negative ($b_{cluster1} = -0.24^*$, $b_{cluster2} = -0.55^{**}$, $b_{cluster3} = -0.23$), meaning that friendly relations between migrants and local population were a deterrent for promoting ethnically–driven return migration. The same effect hadthe factor of belonging of respondent to diasporic group, also corresponding to non–support of this regime, especially in two fist clusters ($b_{cluster1} = -0.90^{**}$, $b_{cluster2} = -0.26^*$).

Simultaneously, age, education and financial situation were factors, reinforcing the support of Russians to return to their historical homeland, at least in one cluster. In particular, in better-off regions of the first cluster there was a tendency to approve such political decisions among wealthier citizens, in the third cluster (national republics) return migration of Russians was welcomed by people with higher education (59.5% of them had non-Russian ethnic identity, so it wasn't a sign of ethnic favoritism as can be expected), whereas in two first clusters with dominant Russian population nationalist decisions were more popular among older generations than among young people. Besides in the third cluster there was a tendency to approve return migration of Russians among people with higher evaluations of personal security (reverse scale, hence negative sign of coefficient).

Table 4.

Logistic regression for support of Russian and Russian-speaking migrants

Таблица 4.

Результаты моделирования (логистическая регрессия) поддержки русских и русскоговорящих мигрантов

| Predictor | Cluster 1 | | Cluster 2 | | Cluster 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Exp(B) | B | Exp(B) | B | Exp(B) |
| Place of residence (urban vs rural) | 0,06 | 1,06 | 0,07 | 1,07 | –0,47 | 0,95 |
| Comparison of own region with other regions of Russia | –0,01 | 0,99 | –0,08 | 0,92 | 0.14 | 1,14 |
| Evaluation of migration in the place of residence (predominance of in- or out-migration) | –0,02 | 0,98 | 0,10 | 1,11 | –0.04 | 0,96 |
| Personal attitude towards migrants in the region (5-point scale) | **–0,24\*** | **0,79** | **–0,55\*\*** | **0,58** | *–0.23* | *0,79* |
| Perception of security (5-point scale) | –0,17 | 0,84 | 0,03 | 1,04 | *–0.27* | *0,76* |
| Household finance | *0,24* | *1,28* | *–0,16* | 0,85 | –0,17 | 0,85 |
| Gender | –0,04 | 0,96 | –0,18 | 0,84 | 0,22 | 0,81 |
| Education | –0,11 | 0,89 | –0,15 | 0,86 | **0,56\*** | **1,75** |
| Belonging to diaspora group | **–0,90\*\*** | **0,41** | **–0,85\*\*** | **0,43** | –0,11 | 0,90 |
| Age | **0,28\*** | **1,32** | **0,26\*** | **1,29** | 0,05 | 1,05 |
| Model χ2 (10) | 41.3 | | 71.6 | | 16.8 | |
| Nagelkerke's R2 | 0.06 | | 0.11 | | 0.04 | |

\*\* — significant at 0.01 level, \* — significant at 0.05 level, values in italics are marginally significant

In the second set, concerning the positive endorsement of stimulation of compatriots of different nationalities from the CIS countries, the number and the content of factors varied greatly from those detected in previous models.

Table 5.

## Logistic regression model for support of compatriots of different nationalities from the CIS countries

Таблица 5.

## Результаты моделирования (логистическая регрессия) поддержки соотечественников разных национальностей из стран СНГ

| Predictor | Cluster 1 | | Cluster 2 | | Cluster 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | Exp(B) | B | Exp(B) | B | Exp(B) |
| Place of residence (urban vs rural) | **−0,96\*\*** | **0,38** | 0,20 | 1,22 | 0,23 | 1,26 |
| Comparison of own region with other regions of Russia | **0,26\*** | **1,29** | *0,18* | *1,20* | 0,00 | 1,00 |
| Evaluation of migration in the place of residence (predominance of in- or out-migration) | 0,02 | 1,02 | 0,06 | 1,06 | 0,11 | 1,12 |
| Personal attitude towards migrants in the region (5-point scale) | −0,04 | 0,96 | 0,06 | 1,07 | *0,21* | *1,24* |
| Perception of security (5-point scale) | **−0,29\*** | **0,74** | *0,19* | *1,20* | 0,17 | 1,18 |
| Household finance | −0,01 | 0,99 | 0,05 | 1,05 | −0,15 | 0,86 |
| Gender | 0,26 | 1,30 | −0,06 | 0,95 | −0,07 | 0,94 |
| Education | **0,44\*** | **1,55** | −0,01 | 0,99 | *0,38* | *1,46* |
| Belonging to diasporas | **0,61\*\*** | **1,84** | 0,20 | 1,23 | 0,40 | 1,49 |
| Age | 0,19 | 1,20 | 0,16 | 1,18 | *−0,23* | *0,79* |
| Model χ2 (10) | 53.3 | | 13.8 | | 16.4 | |
| Nagelkerke's R2 | 0.08 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | |

Most significant results were found in regions of the first cluster. Internationalist approach based on rather civil grounds and common history of returnees than ethnic differentiation was more popular among people living in the rural area ($b_{cluster1} = -0.96^{**}$), in comparison with urban inhabitants, for whom the perspective to encourage migration from former soviet republics was less attractive.

At the same time, the support of this strategy was associated with negative results of comparison of own region with other regions of Russia ($b_{cluster1} = 0.26^{*}$), high levels of precepted security ($b_{cluster1} = 0.29^{*}$), higher education ($b_{cluster1} = 0.44^{*}$), and especially — with belonging to diasporic groups most of which were representatives of the so called "titular" nationalities in the new independent states.

In other two clusters there were only some statistical tendencies, that, however, shouldn't be neglected, as they were forming some general pattern of perception of return migration in several regions.

In particular, there was similar effect of evaluation of socio–economic position of the region with other regions of Russia on support of internationalist migration poli-

cy ($b_{cluster2}$ = 0.18, p < 0,1), meaning that in the conscience of population there was a clear link between economic and demographic issues and their resolution was associated with among other decisions with stimulated return migration.

Instead, the perception of security in the second cluster had opposite effect on this strategy, as more support was given by those who felt themselves in less secure position ($b_{cluster2}$ = 0.19, p < 0,1), in contrast with the first cluster, that witnessed about differentiated impact of this in different socio–economic and demographic conditions. The factor of education was also reproduced in the third cluster ($b_{cluster3}$ = 0.38, p < 0,1), that, considering that higher  Besides in these regions two additional tendencies were detected, showing positive association between favorable attitudes towards compatriots from the CIS countries and migrants living in the region and negative effect of age, meaning that older generations were reluctant to admit ideas of more diverse and different ethno-cultural future of the region.

## Discussion and conclusion

The results of our analysis show that there are at least several basic contradictions, impeding more effective realization of migration policy concerning repatriation.

The first consists in the doubtful possibility to increase population in economically depressed regions by involving compatriots, because it runs counter to basic economic theories, postulating that migration occurs when the sum of possible benefits exceeds the sum of risks and costs of the resettlement and refusal of migration. In other words, migration should lead to better — secure and more comfortable life in economically attractive conditions. In our case the choice of the "territory of the priority resettlement" can happen only if compatriot has worse conditions of life, that definitely narrows the circle of possible participants, willing to move into Russia. Besides, regions themselves are still far from dealing adequately with the task of attraction of compatriots, that results in their demands to exclude them from the Program or to give a delay in execution. Even if they ensure initial installation of compatriots, it's almost impossible to stop their further move to more favorable regions.

In the case of successful territories, large migration flows and competition on the labour market allow for dictating terms of participation in order to regulate them more efficiently that is justified. Meanwhile, for compatriots wishing to return to Russia it is a supplementary obstacle and a push factor. As a direct consequence, there is a high demand for resettlement in attractive regions, which are excluded from the Program or difficult to get into, and low demand for unattractive regions that could not be raised even with additional stimulation.Taking into account another barriers, related to specific requirements, needed to prove eligibility for receiving privileges contained in the Program, it is clear that Program outcomes are far from ideal and their impact on regional development is rather invisible.

Attitudes of local population towards returnees is another important factor, determining efficiency of migration policy. Our results show that they differ considerably depending on socio–economic, demographic and ethnocultural characteristics of regional society. More prosperous is region and attractive for migrants, more people are

against free and unlimited international migration, including return migration of Russian-speaking compatriots of different nationalities. Although the level of manifest migrantophobia and support of repressive policy is rather low, some hot beds of tension are located in the regions of the first clusters, especially among Russian population with stable financial position, more often supporting ethnically-driven strategies. National republics, covered by our surveys, in contrast, demonstrate approval of liberal internationalist migration policy regimes, Russian compatriots in these regions are more welcomed by more educated people, living in more secure conditions.

It is clear that the intent to increase the flow of return migration, the attraction of compatriots, especially from economically developed countries, should not be directed to close gaps in demographic policy, but oriented towards long-term perspectives of reunification and strengthening positions of the Russian nation, that will require conditions, meeting the expectations of both returnees and local population.

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