TRANSACTION COSTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
УДК 334.012.23; 658.8
Abstract
The paper presents a discursive analysis of the use of the category of “transaction costs”. The similarity of the concepts of “transaction costs’ and “costs of the marketing” by E. Chamberlin is demonstrated. However, in the original discourse of R. Coase, transaction costs are considered as the costs of using the price mechanism associated with the market allocation of resources. The firm, as a hierarchical economic system, was an alternative allocation mechanism to the market. The factors that influence the value of transaction costs in O. Williamson’s contract theory are almost unrelated to sales and the marketing. In the discourse of J. Buchanan and M. Olson transaction costs are costs arising in the political market. For J. Buchanan, these are the “positive” costs of creating new laws that reduce the social costs associated with the production and distribution of public goods. M. Olson’s discourse addresses not only the “positive” but also the “negative” costs associated with dividing markets through government regulation. In turn, R. Coase himself, investigating the problem of social costs associated with external effects, in fact got rid of transaction costs, equating them to zero. It is this situation of “Coase’s theorem” that began to be used in the framework of the analysis methodology of the discipline “Economics and Law”. The paper proposes an interpretation of transaction costs as costs of overcoming the boundaries between heterogeneous systems, based on the discourse of E. de Soto. In this case, the prices of legality/illegality can be viewed as the transaction costs of using different economic systems.
Downloads
Metrics
References
Макклоски Д. Риторика экономической науки. М.; СПб., 2015. 328 с.
Кламер А. Странная наука экономика: приглашение к разговору. М.; СПб., 2015. 336 с.
Коуз Р. Природа фирмы: истоки // Природа фирмы / под ред. О. Уильямсона и С. Уинтера. М., 2001. С.53-73.
Чемберлин Э. Теория монополистической конкуренции. Реориентация теории стоимости. М., 1996. 349 с.
Коуз Р. Природа фирмы // Природа фирмы / под ред. О. Уильямсона и С. Уинтера. М., 2001. С. 33-52.
Коуз Р. Природа фирмы: истолкование // Природа фирмы / под ред. О. Уильямсона и С. Уинтера. М., 2001. С. 74-92.
Dahlman C. The Problem of Externality // Journal of Law and Economics. 1979. Vol. 22. Pp. 141-162.
Одинцова М. И. Институциональная экономика. М., 2009. 397 с.
Шервин Р. Трансакционные издержки и внутренние рынки труда // Природа фирмы / под ред. О. Уильямсона и С. Уинтера. М., 2001. С. 92-111.
Уильямсон О. Экономические институты капитализма: Фирмы, рынки, «отношенческая» контрактация. СПб., 1996. 702 с.
Стиглер Дж. Гражданин и государство. Эссе о регулировании. М., 2017. 336 с.
Тироль Ж. Экономика для общего блага. М., 2020. 696 с.
Срничек Н. Капитализм платформ. М., 2019. 125 с.
Макконнел К., Брю С. Экономикс. Принципы, проблемы, политика. Т. 2. М., 1993. 400 c.
Wallis J., North D. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970 / Engermann S. and Gallman R. (eds) // Long-term factors in American Economic Growth. Chicago, 1986. Pp. 95-161.
Хасанов И. Ш., Хасанова К. И. Зарубежный опыт измерения трансакционного сектора национальной экономики (Методология определения трансакционных издержек американскими экономистами Дугласом Нортом и Джоном Уоллисом) // Вестник Татарского государственного гуманитарно-педагогического университета. 2008. № 3 (14). С. 67-70.
Нуреев Р. М. Очерки по истории институционализма. Ростов-на-Дону, 2014. 415 c.
Шиллер Р. Финансы и хорошее общество. М., 2014. 501 c.
Бьюкенен Дж. Границы свободы (между анархией и Левиафаном) // Бьюкенен Дж. Сочинения. М., 1997. C. 207-444.
Бьюкенен Дж., Таллок У. Расчет согласия. Логические основания конституционной демократии // Бьюкенен Дж. Сочинения. М., 1997. C. 31-206.
Олсон М. Логика коллективных действий. Общественные блага и теория групп. М., 1995. 174 c.
Олсон М. Возвышение и упадок народов. Экономический рост, стагфляция и социальный склероз. М., 2013. 322 c.
Аджемоглу Д., Робинсон Дж. Почему одни страны богатые, а другие бедные. Происхождение власти, процветания и нищеты. М., 2012. 692 c.
Норт Д., Уоллис Д., Вайнгаст Б. Насилие и социальные порядки. Концептуальные рамки для интерпретации письменной истории человечества. М., 2011. 478 c.
Коуз Р. Проблема социальных издержек // Коуз Р. Фирма, рынок и право. М., 2007. С. 92-149.
Коуз Р. Маяк в экономической теории // Коуз Р. Фирма, рынок и право. М., 2007. С. 177-201.
Стедмен-Джоунз Д. Рождение неолиберальной политики. От Хайека и Фридмена до Рейгана и Тэтчер. М.; Челябинск, 2017. 520 c.
Фрэнк Р. Дарвиновская экономика: Свобода, конкуренция и общее благо. М., 2013. 341 c.
Сото Э. де. Иной путь. Экономический ответ терроризму. Челябинск, 2008. 408 c.
Штрик В. Купленное время. Отсроченный кризис демократического капитализма. Цикл лекций в рамках Франкфуртских чтений памяти Адорно. М., 2019. 275 с.
Коуз Р. Нобелевская лекция «Институциональная структура производства» // Природа фирмы / под ред. О. Уильямсона и С. Уинтера. М., 2001. С. 340-351.
REFERENCES
MacCloskey D. The Rhetoric of Economics. M.; SPb., 2015. 328 p.
Klamer A. Speaking of Economics. How to get in the conversation. M.; SPb., 2015. 336 p.
Coase R. The Nature of the Firm: Origins // The Nature of the Firm / ed. O. Williamson and S. Winter. M., 2001. Pp. 53-73.
Chamberlin E. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Reorientation of the Theory of Value. M., 1996. 349 p.
Coase R. The Nature of the Firm // The Nature of the Firm / еd. O. Williamson and S. Winter. M., 2001. Pp. 33-52.
Coase R. The Nature of the Firm: Interpretation // The Nature of the Firm / еd. O. Williamson and S. Winter. M., 2001. Pp. 74-92.
Dahlman C. The Problem of Externality // Journal of Law and Economics. 1979. Vol. 22. Pp. 141-162.
Odintsova M. I. Institutional economy. M., 2009. 397 p.
Sherwin R. Transaction costs and internal labor markets // The Nature of the Firm / еd. O. Williamson and S. Winter. M, 2001. Pp. 92-111.
Williamson O. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, «Relational» Contracting. SPb., 1996. 702 p.
Stigler J. Citizen and the State. Essay on Regulation. M., 2017. 336 p.
Tyrol J. An Economy for the Common Good. M., 2020. 696 p.
Srnichek N. Platform Capitalism. M., 2019. 125 p.
McConnell K., Bru S. Economics. Principles, Problems, Politics. Vol. 2. M., 1993. 400 p.
Wallis J., North D. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970 / Engermann S. and Gallman R. (eds) // Long-term factors in American Economic Growth. Chicago, 1986. Pp. 95-161.
Khasanov I. Sh., Khasanova K. I. Foreign Experience in Measuring the Transactional Sector of the National Economy (Methodology for determining Transaction Costs by American Economists Douglas North and John Wallis) // Bulletin of the Tatar State Humanitarian Pedagogical University. 2008. No. 3 (14). Pp. 67-70.
Nureyev R. M. Essays on the History of Institutionalism. Rostov on Don, 2014. 415 p.
Schiller R. Finance and Good Society. M., 2014. 501 p.
Buchanan J. The Boundaries of Freedom (Between Anarchy and Leviathan). // Buchanan J. Works. M., 1997. Pp. 207-444.
Buchanan J., Tullock W. Consent Calculation. The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy // Buchanan J. Works. M., 1997. Pp. 31-206.
Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and Group Theory. M., 1995. 174 p.
Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations. M., 2013. 322 p.
Acemoglu D., Robinson J. Why Are Some Countries Rich and Others Poor. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. M., 2012. 692 p.
North D., Wallis J., Weingast B. Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. M., 2011. 478 p.
Coase R. The Problem of Social Costs // Coase R. Firm, Market and Law. M., Pp. 92-149.
Coase R. Lighthouse in Economic Theory // Coase R. Firm, Market and Law. M., Pp. 177-201.
Steadman-Jones D. The Birth of Neoliberal Politics. From Hayek and Friedman to Reagan and Thatcher. M.; Chelyabinsk, 2017. 520 p.
Frank R. The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good. M., 2013. 341 p.
Soto E. de. Another Way. An Economic Response to Terrorism. Chelyabinsk, 2008. 408 p.
Shtrik V. Purchased Time. Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. A Series of Lectures in the Framework of the Frankfurt Readings in Memory of Adorno. M., 2019. 275 p.
Coase R. Nobel Lecture «Institutional Structure of Production» // The Nature of the Firm / еd. O. Williamson and S. Winter. M., 2001. Pp. 33-52.
Copyright (c) 2021 Петр Александрович Ореховский
![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Economics Profession Business is a golden publisher, as we allow self-archiving, but most importantly we are fully transparent about your rights.
Authors may present and discuss their findings ahead of publication: at biological or scientific conferences, on preprint servers, in public databases, and in blogs, wikis, tweets, and other informal communication channels.
Economics Profession Business (EPB) allows authors to deposit manuscripts (currently under review or those for intended submission to EPB) in non-commercial, pre-print servers such as ArXiv.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).